A Stripe secret key leaked: the payments-specific runbook
Charge audits, refund review, webhook rotation, restricted-key replacement — Stripe-specific order of operations.
What actually happened
Stripe incidents carry financial-reconciliation duties alongside technical ones. The build reported success at every step, which is exactly why nobody stopped it.
- Export events around the anomaly window.
- Create replacement → migrate consumers → revoke exposed (strict order).
- Rotate whsec_ companions separately.
- Harden account controls (2FA, access review, restricted keys).
Every step above is individually reasonable and none of them prints a warning. The value crosses into the bundle during substitution, not execution, so nothing in your runtime ever sees the moment it happened.
What someone can do with it
Payments-specific stakes:
- Direct financial manipulation pre-revocation.
- Customer PII reads fold into disclosure questions.
Rotate first
Rotate before you touch any code. The key has been served to every visitor since the deploy that introduced it, cached by CDNs along the way, and very likely harvested by crawlers that scan served JavaScript for exactly these shapes. dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys + /webhooks Removing the string from source does not un-publish it; only revocation closes the door.
A rotated key left in old deploys is still discoverable in CDN caches and archived copies. Rotation plus redeploy closes both halves; either alone leaves the door ajar.
Move the call somewhere the browser cannot read
The structural fix is always the same shape: the call moves to a context that holds the key without serving it, and the browser asks your server instead.
new Stripe("sk_live_FAKE…") // client bundleserver-only checkout route creating sessionsCheck whether yours is exposed
You can check manually right now: open the site, view source or open DevTools, and search the built JavaScript for eyJ. A hit means the string shipped; decode or prefix-check it before deciding how bad the news is.
Manual searching proves one page on one day. KeyDrift fetches the deployment the way a browser would, follows chunks named only in route manifests, reads streamed hydration payloads, and classifies what it finds — secret, or public-by-design — so an anon key never shows up dressed as an emergency.
Keep it from coming back
One more thing worth knowing before you close the tab: fixing this once does not end the story. Agents imitate whatever pattern is already in the repo, templates carry their own defaults, and the next feature request can reintroduce the same shape of code. Continuous monitoring re-scans every deploy and alerts only on change — new, regressed, resolved — so the comeback attempt is a notification instead of a quarter-end surprise.
Why this failure class persists
Zoom out and the pattern is bigger than one repo. AI-assisted output has outgrown review capacity everywhere at once, which means thousands of teams are making the same reasonable-looking tradeoffs in the same week. Nobody using modern tooling is uniquely exposed. The failure mode documented above is the modal outcome of velocity without verification, not evidence of carelessness.
How KeyDrift reports this exact finding
Report anatomy matters during incidents, so it is worth reading once calmly: masked string (never the live value — it ceases to exist outside the detection engine), salted fingerprint (trackable within your workspace, useless to strangers), chunk path (your starting point for a "git log -S" hunt), disposition (secret versus public-by-design), confidence (matches below 0.5 never reach the page at all).
Manual check, step by step
The full manual drill, for readers who want zero dependence on any tool: open the deployed site in a private window; launch DevTools → Sources; use Search-all-files (Ctrl/Cmd+Shift+F) for eyJ; then repeat for the other marker families — eyJ, sk_live_, sk-proj-, AKIA, postgres, BEGIN PRIVATE KEY. Decode anything JWT-shaped before reacting, and classify public-by-design formats as expected guests rather than intruders.
Close the loop with monitoring
If you take one operational step from this page, make it this: put the URL under continuous monitoring (free tier covers one project daily). The first scan tells you whether you have a problem today; the schedule tells you whether the problem comes back next month after someone re-adds the convenient line.
Common questions
Tell customers?
Disclosure depends on data touched — counsel conversation; considerations page frames it.
Radar helps?
Radar addresses fraud patterns, not published keys — complementary tools.
Run a free scan at keydrift.dev/scan — paste a URL or the bundle source itself, no account. Findings arrive masked, with the exact chunk they live in.